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CASE NOTES
TORTS-ABUSE OF PROCESS-AN EXCESSIVE ATTACHMENT
SUPPORTS A CLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS RATHER THAN
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND SUCH CLAIM MAY BE BROUGHT IN
THE ACTION IN WHICH THE ATTACHMENT WAS ISSUED. White
Lighting Company v. Wolfson (Cal. 19'68).
White Lighting Company brought suit against Wolfson, a
former employee, to recover $850 allegedly advanced against future
commissions. Wolfson denied the debt and cross-complained,
alleging an oral employment agreement. The Company obtained a
writ of attachment' and attached property worth approximately
$20,000 to secure the $850 claim. Wolfson then amended his cross-
complaint, charging that the over-attachment constituted an abuse
of process.2 The trial court sustained a general demurrer to this
count of the cross-complaint on the ground that the cause of action
was premature. The court believed that the action was based upon
malicious prosecution which requires the successful termination of
the process in favor of the attachment-defendant.
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, held, reversed. An
excessive attachment supports a claim for abuse of process rather
than malicious prosecution and such claim may be brought in the
action in which the attachment was issued.3 White Lighting
Company v. Wolfson, 68 Adv. Cal. 347, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1968),petition for rehearing denied May 1, 1968.
The court clarified the confused status of wrongful attachment
suits in California by distinguishing wrongful attachments,
(1) levied maliciously and without probable cause;
(2) maliciously procured when not entitled to the writ;
(3) levied against property valued far in excess of the
actual debt or exempt from attachment;
(4) used to realize an improper purpose.4
The first and fourth types of wrongful attachment have been
properly treated as supporting actions for malicious prosecution
I. For the procedure in attaching property refer to CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 540
(West 1954), as amended, (Supp. 1967).
2. The cross-complaint also included two counts for alleged violations of the 1933
Securities Act, two on the oral employment contract, and one based on quantum meruit.
3. The opinion contained two additional holdings concerned with other counts in the
litigation. These dealt with the statute of frauds with reference to oral employment contracts.
4. 68 Adv. Cal. at 360,438 P.2d at 352-53, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05.
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and abuse of process respectively.' The confusion has occurred in
those cases where the attachment was regularly issued but the
creditor was not entitled to the writ, or where the value of the
property attached was far in excess of the legitimate claim., Two
means of recovery have been available to the attachment debtor for
damages arising from these types.
First, the attachment debtor may recover from the attachment
creditor or his sureties in an action based upon the undertaking.,
This is allowed by statute on attachments where the action was
terminated in favor of the attachment-defendant. Recovery may be
had for all damages proximately caused by the wrongful
attachment up to the amount of the bond.' Thus, if the attachment-
defendant suffered damages in excess of the value of the bond he
could not be fully compensated in an action based upon the
undertaking.
The second means of recovery, an action for malicious
prosecution, is not limited to the amount of the undertaking.
However, as noted by the court in White Lighting, two elements
essential to malicious prosecution may be lacking in an over-
attachment situation:
(1), The absence of probable cause in initiating the
proceeding;
(2) the termination of the action in favor of the
attachment-defendant. 9
Thus, any recovery, regardless of size, would be sufficient to
defeat an action based upon either the undertaking or malicious
prosecution. Since the attaching creditor usually recovered on his
claim, though for a considerably smaller amount than the value of
the attached property, 0 the attachment-defendant had no remedy
for damages proximately caused by the over-attachment. White
5. Id. at 360, 438 P.2d at 353, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 705. See Goland v. Peter Nolan & Co., 2
Cal. 2d 96, 38 P.2d 783 (1934); Crews v. Mayo, 165 Cal. 493, 132 P. 1032 (1913); Vesper v.
Crane Co., 165 Cal. 36, 130 P. 876 (1913); King v. Montgomery, 50 Cal. 115 (1875); Merron
v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 27 Cal. App. 2d 119, 80 P.2d 740 (1938).
6. 68 Adv. Cal. at 360, 438 P.2d at 353, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 705. See Spellens v. Spellens,
49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957); Pimentel v. Houk, 101 Cal. App. 2d 884, 226 P.2d
739 (1951).
7. For the statutory requirement for the undertaking see CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc.
§ 539 (West 1954).
8. Id.




Lighting provides the needed remedy because an action for abuse of
process, unlike actions based upon malicious prosecution or the
undertaking, can be maintained regardless of whether the process
was terminated in the defendant's favor or, as in the case of
malicious prosecution, that the process was initiated without
probable cause.
Additionally, White Lighting in overruling Division of Labor
Law Enforcement v. Barnes,' allowed the attachment-defendant to
assert damages in the primary action. Heretofore, the rule was that
damages caused by wrongful attachment could not be made the
basis of a counterclaim because such damages were not considered
as arising out of the transaction specified in the complaint. 2 In
holding to the contrary the court pointed out that:
[I]n cases such as the instant one in which the alleged
wrongful attachment falls under categories (2), (3), and (4) a
termination of that action in favor of the attachment defendant
has no bearing upon the determination of whether the
attachment writ was maliciously procured or improperly used. 3
Thus the court concluded there was no reason why the attachment-
defendant should not be allowed to pursue a counterclaim for abuse
of process in the action where the attachment was initiated.
The holding is also significant in that it broadens the definition
of an abuse or misuse of a process. It clearly indicates that the
abuse need not always take the form of an overt threat to coerce the
plaintiff into doing something he is not legally obligated to do. This
appears to reverse a recent trend' 4 where the tort was apparently
being limited to this very narrow form of abuse.
The essential elements of abuse of process have not been
clearly defined in California.'5 In attempting to define the required
elements, the leading cases' 6 cite Dean Prosser 7 and the
11. 205 Cal. App. 2d 337, 23 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1962).
12. Id. at 346, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
13. 68 Adv. Cal. at 362,438 P.2d at 354, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
14. See Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957); Coy v. Advance
Automatic Sales Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 313, 39 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1964); Fairfield v. Hamilton,
206 Cal. App. 2d 594, 24 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1962); Tellefsen v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 198 Cal.
App. 2d 611, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1961).
15. 1 Cal. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 5 (1952).
16. Pimentel v. Houk, 101 Cal. App. 2d 884, 226 P.2d 739 (1951); Tranchina v.
Arcinas, 78 Cal. App. 2d 522, 178 P.2d 65 (1948); and cases cited in note 14 supra.
17. Prosser defined these element as follows:
The essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has developed, have been
stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the
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Restatement of Torts.8 From these sources it is clear that there are
at least two elements necessary to sustain the tort.
First, there must be an ulterior motive or purpose behind the
use of the process. This improper purpose must be the primary,
motivating factor in the initiation of the process and must pervert
the intended use of the process. It no longer appears that malice is
required, 9 but regardless of whether malice is necessary, it can be
inferred from the second element, the wilful abuse of the process. 20
Although the ulterior motive may be inferred by the misuse of the
process, the misuse of the process cannot be inferred from the
motive.2'
The second element necessary to sustain the tort is that there
must be a definite, wilful act in the use of the process not authorized
by the process. 22 The confusion existing about this tort stems from
process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. Some definite act
or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate
in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability where the defendant
has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion,
even though with bad intentions. The improper purpose usually takes the form
of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the
proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money, by
use of the process as a threat or a club. There is, in other words, a form of
extortion, and it is what is done in the course'of negotiation, rather than the
issuance or any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort
(emphasis added).
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 877 (3rd ed. 1964) (footnotes omitted).
18. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 682. General Principle.
One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another to
accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed is liable to the other for the
pecuniary loss caused thereby.
Comment:
a. The gravamen of the misconduct for which the liability stated in this
Section is imposed is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the
wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process,
no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was
designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was properly
issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings which were brought with
probable cause and for a proper purpose or even that the proceedings terminated
in favor of the person instituting or initiating them. The subsequent misuse of
the process, though properly obtained, constitutes the misconduct for which the
liability is imposed under the rule stated in this Section.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 682 (1938).
19. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 232, 317 P.2d 613, 626 (1957); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 876 (3rd ed. 1964).
20. Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal. App. 2d 522, 526, 178 P.2d 65, 68; Pimentel v. Houk,
101 Cal. App. 2d 884, 886, 226 P.2d 739, 740.
21. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 877 (3rd ed. 1964).
22. See cases cited note 14 supra.
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the uncertainty of what constitutes an act that abuses the process.
Usually, the act is a threat made subsequent to the issuance of the
process and with the intent to coerce compliance to the demands of
the defendant. 3 An analysis of California case law24 seems to
indicate that a legal process may be abused in either of two general
ways:
(1) An overt threat made with the intent to prevert the
process, or
(2) the use of the process in violation of the defendant's
rights.
The first is the classic form of abuse of process and consists of
an overt threat with the intent to coerce the plaintiff into doing
something he is not legally obligated to do.
The leading California case permitting recovery is Spellens v.
Spellens,25 where a writ of attachment was employed by the
husband to coerce his wife into dropping her action for a judicial
declaration that their marriage was valid. During the execution of
the attachment, the husband offered to drop his claim if the wife
would drop her action. Here the use of the attachment process was
clearly perverted, and resulted in an abuse of process.
In Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines,26 the plaintiff
brought an action for abuse of process charging that the defendant
appealed from an adverse judgment in another action with the
purpose of obtaining a compromise settlement of the judgment.
The court, in sustaining a general demurrer, stated that there must
be some act other than the mere issuance of the process to sustain
an action based upon abuse of process.
In Coy v. Advance Automatic Sales Co.,21 the plaintiff owned
and operated an amusement machine business. The defendant, a
creditor and competitor, had sued in a prior action for an amount
alleged to be greater than actually owed. A writ of attachment was
issued and the plaintiff's machines were attached, the value of the
machines being far in excess of the amount prayed for in the
complaint. During the levy, the defendant accompanied the
marshall and installed his own machines wherever the plaintiffs
were removed. In holding that an over-attachment did not
23. See note 17 supra, where Dean Prosser stresses this form of the tort.
24. See cases cited notes 14 and 16 supra.
25. 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957).
26. 198 Cal. App. 2d 611, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1961).
27. 228 Cal. App. 2d 313, 39 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1964).
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constitute an act sufficient to sustain an action for abuse of
process,28 the court cited Tellefsen with favor and reiterated the
requirement of some act other than the issuance of the process.
The most restrictive California case with respect to what
constitutes a sufficient act is Fairfield v. Hamilton,29 where the
court denied an action for abuse of process because there was no
direct evidence that the defendant offered to drop his action if the
plaintiff complied with his demands. The implication was that an
overt threat subsequent to the initiation of the process was
absolutely essential to sustain the action. It was precisely for this
reason that the lower court sustained the demurrer in White
Lighting v. Wolfson.3° The court stated that Wolfson alleged only
an improper motive and failed to set out an act sufficient to support
an action for abuse of process. Adherence to the rule in Fairfield
would permit recovery only in those cases where there was direct
evidence of an overt threat. In the case of an improper or excessive
use of the process, absent any overt threat, there could be no
recovery. The Fairfield court gave no indication that the abuse
could be found in a form other than an overt threat to coerce the
plaintiff into doing something he was not obligated to do.
However, it appears that those cases3 which required an overt
threat to sustain the tort have overlooked a less restrictive form of
the tort, as reflected in Tranchina v. Archinas,32 and Pimentel v.
Houk.33 These cases illustrate the principle that the use of a legal
process which violates a legally protected right of the defendant
may constitute an abuse of process.
In Tranchina, the defendant deceived the Office of Price
Administration into permitting him to evict the plaintiff-tenant.
The certificate authorized the eviction solely for the immediate
occupancy by the owner. Following the eviction the owner failed to
occupy the premises and instead rented portions of the property. In
holding that such use of a legal process constituted an abuse of
process the court laid the foundation for the second form of abuse
of process. According to Pimentel it was the violation by the
28. This holding has been specifically overruled by White Lighting, 68 Adv. Cal. 347,
361 n.8, 438 P.2d 345, 354 n.8, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 706 n.8 (1968).
29. 206 Cal. App. 2d 594, 24 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1962).
30. 59 Cal. Rptr. 598, 600-01.
3 1. See cases note 14 supra.
32. 78 Cal. App. 2d 522, 178 P.2d 65 (1948).
33. 101 Cal. App. 2d 884, 226 P.2d 739 (1951).
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landlord of the legal duty of peaceful enjoyment owed to the tenant
that constituted the tort. 4
In Pimentel, the plaintiff attached defendant's farming
equipment to secure an anticipated judgment on two promissory
notes. Defendant counterclaimed alleging that plaintiff levied the
attachment for the sole purpose of financially destroying the
defendant. The court held that the cross-complaint did not show an
improper use of the attachment process, merely an improper
motive in using it. However, the court impliedly35 took a more
liberal position with respect to what constitutes an abuse or misuse
of the attachment process. In supporting the lower court's
demurrer on the facts of the case, it was said:
It is not alleged that said attachment covered property
exempt from execution, that it covered an excessive amount of
the defendant's property, that the debt alleged to be owed by
defendant was otherwise secured, or that defendant requested
that the levy be made upon other property. 6
Thus, in dicta, Pimentel offered the most liberal interpretation
of what might constitute an act sufficient to sustain an action for
abuse of process, and previewed the result in White Lighting. In
discussing Tranchina, the court in Pimentel stated "that the
tort in the cited case lay in the violation by the landlord of a legal
duty he owed the tenant."3 It was the first case to articulate this
form of abuse although Trachina was the first case actually
allowing recovery.
The legal duty owed to an attachment-defendant was expressed
in Barceloux v. Dow,38 where the defendant's property had been
attached to secure payment of attorneys' fees of $35,000. The trial
court sustained the defendant's motion to discharge the
attachments on all property in excess of the amount stated by the
plaintiff in the affidavit. The appellate court affirmed the order and
in interpreting section 540 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure39 it held that the attachment-plaintiff owed a duty
34. Id. at 889, 226 P.2d at 742.
35. 68 Adv. Cal. 347, 361 n.7, 438 P.2d 345, 353 n.7, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705 n.7 (1968).
36. 101 Cal. App. 2dat 886, 226 P.2d at 740.
37. Id. at 889, 226 P.2d at 742.
38. 174 Cal. App. 2d 170, 344 P.2d 41 (1959).
39. The statute provides;
[t]he writ must be directed to the sheriff, or a constable, or marshal of any
county in which property of such defendant may be, and must require him to
1969]
SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW
"to attach only so much of defendant's property as is necessary
to satisfy plaintiff's claim in full."4
White Lighting represents that class of cases where use of the
process by the creditor was proper, but where it was carried to an
extent not intended by the process. As in Tranchina, no overt threat
was required to sustain the action. White Lighting, although not
articulating the wrong in terms of a violation of a legal duty
recognized that:
the wrongfulness in the excessive attachment lies, not in the
institution of the suit or the procurement of the attachment, but
in the illegitimate use of the attachment process to tie up more
property than is reasonably necessary to secure the attaching
creditor's claim. 4'
If one interprets the excessive attachment as a violation of the
right of the defendant to enjoy his property free from unwarranted
interference from others, then such a result appears consistent with
the decision in Tranchina and the dicta in Pimentel.
The holding in White Lighting raises a difficult question with
regard to whether the creditor need have knowledge42 that the
attachment is excessive43 before an action for abuse of process can
be maintained. The difficulty in determining the value of the
debtor's property would be a reason for denying any strict liability.
On the other hand, it would seem reasonable that the attachment
creditor cannot attach property indiscriminately without making
any inquiry concerning its value.
White Lighting firmly establishes the principle that processes
legally issued can be perverted by pursuing the action beyond the
normally intended purpose. It is clear that a direct and overt act to
attach and safely keep all the property of such defendant within his county not
exempt from execution, . . . or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy
the plaintiff's demand against such defendant, the amount of which must be
stated in conformity with the complaint ....
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 540 (West 1954), as anended, (Supp. 1967).
40. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 173, 344 P.2d at 44.
41. 68 Adv. Cal. at 361, 438 P.2d at 354, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
42. The attachment-creditor will usually have little or no knowledge regarding existing
claims upon the debtor's property. Thus, the attachment of that property, though of greater
value than claimed in the affidavit, will not secure the debt because of the superior claims of
the preexisting creditors.
43. White Lighting did not consider the question of what constitutes an over
attachment. Criteria for determining whether any specific attachment is reasonable have not
been delineated by the California courts.
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coerce or threaten the defendant into submission is no longer an
essential element to sustain an action for abuse of process. In those
cases where the formal use of the process interferes with a legally
protected right of the defendant, such use can constitute an act
sufficient to sustain the tort.
EDWARD D. LAPLOUNT
